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It is not easy to say this, but fundamentally, this is a very disappointing book. Jerry 
Cohen was killed by a massive stroke just several months ago at the too young age of 
68. He was, as I am sure every reader of this review must know, a tireless critic of 
Rawls in the name of a more thoroughgoing egalitarianism. He was also, truly, 
undeniably, one the nicer guys you could ever hope to meet, one of those people who 
seem just naturally to like others and have a certain pleasing enthusiasm for life. I bet 
he was very popular with students, and will be much missed by all who knew him. 
Given his warm and engaging personality, his early, unexpected death and, for many, 
the appealing nature of his political positions, it is not, as I say, a welcome task to open 
a review with a judgment of this kind on his final substantive work, but, sadly, there it 
is. Rescuing Justice and Equality is certainly provocative (to me at least), and Cohen 
deserves great credit for pursuing the issues he cares about with a certain starkness and 
determination, but for a work by a philosopher this senior, and with this sort of claim 
upon our attention, it is also remarkably casual, badly written, repetitive, and 
gratuitously, almost gleefully dogmatic. 
  
Cohen raises a challenge that any thoroughgoing assessment of Rawls must take up, 
and, since it is fair to say that Rawls will now be with us forever, it follows that Cohen 
will be too. But I think that while Cohen has hit upon a genuine problem – indeed, upon 
what is in political philosophy an unusually deep problem – his own handling of this 
problem is superficial and unsatisfactory. And it is unsatisfactory in at least two ways. 
To begin with, I think Cohen makes two related mistakes regarding how to understand 
Rawls’ argument, or how what is generated by that argument may be justified. In the 
first place, the considerations that are in play under the veil of ignorance by no means 
exhaust what we can say on behalf of whatever arrangements are chosen there. (We  
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may, for example defend a free speech regime for all sorts of reasons besides the fact 
that it would be chosen by parties ignorant of their political conceptions and anxious to 
preserve their liberty.) And conversely, the claims we affirm as right for the 
understandings governing the original position are by no means necessarily true as 
such, and so to be affirmed everywhere. (Conceptions of the good are rightly treated as 
equal under the veil of ignorance, but we need not say they are in fact equally good, 
equal tout court.) As I will argue, I think Cohen in fact makes both errors in his 
arguments against Rawls, and against the difference principle.  
 
Secondly, Cohen just fails to take up, with any force or imagination, the maddeningly 
difficult question of what talent or effort might reasonably ask for itself in a society 
fundamentally committed to equality of opportunity. Of course, this is a very hard 
issue. I don’t claim to have perfect (or even not so bad) clarity here. But Cohen seems 
uninterested in what makes it hard to begin with (at least for those not antecedently 
committed to the bromides of parlour Marxism). The result is quite paradoxical: while 
the issue of talent or desert is in some ways at the centre of a very long book by a senior 
philosopher, it is also barely taken up at all, repeatedly set aside, and the reader feels 
cheated out of the discussion that the subject deserves. The same two or three fairly thin 
arguments are rehearsed over and over, while what makes the issue both interesting and 
difficult is never pursued. 
 
In what follows, I will first sketch out Cohen’s argument regarding justice and equality, 
how he gets to where he does. Given his reading of the consideration Rawls points to in 
his argument, Cohen sees himself (as his title would have it), as rescuing Rawls’ 
argument. It is entirely understandable why would Cohen think this, but because I think 
he misreads the “morally arbitrary” argument, so crucial to his purposes, I think he is 
dead wrong about Rawls, and, far more importantly, just wrong about what justice 
requires. He does not “rescue” justice. He instead, quite consistently, arrives at a wildly 
implausible conception of it. And seeing why it is implausible is I think of genuine 
importance apart from any issue of Rawls interpretation. 
 
So what is the argument, the complaint, exactly? Although this is a long and wide 
ranging book, it is driven throughout by a single, simple claim: Rawls’ difference 
principle, as Rawls has articulated it, is insufficiently egalitarian, and a society in 
compliance with the difference principle could well be wildly unjust. (74 – 78) Cohen 
is not interested in raising the sort of deep structural challenges we saw say thirty years 
ago, where Rawls was accused of begging substantive questions in the way the parties 
were conceived, or in the way the original position was set up (consider the complaints 
of Nozick, or feminists, or communitarians in this regard). Rather, Cohen feels Rawls 
has, in certain parts of the argument at least, got the importance of equality absolutely 
right, and the reasons why we must insist on equality in political life absolutely right. 
(28) The problem is that he fails to grasp that his difference principle, and his 
justification for it, won’t necessarily carry these principles, and these reasons, through 
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into social life in a substantive way. Or, more accurately, the difference principle 
allows citizens to renege, in actual life, on the very things they affirmed when in a 
position of fairness. And this is just wrong, wrong, wrong. (32; 76) 
 
After all, when under the veil of ignorance, deciding what arrangements to endorse, we 
must, according to Rawls, assess competing arrangements from the standpoint of the 
least advantaged (say, the unskilled labourer).  Obviously, where equality guarantees 
the most optimal outcome, (as is the case with the distribution of political rights and 
freedoms), then it is equality we would choose. But, as Rawls says, if inequality were 
part of an arrangement in which the least advantaged, the ones who had the lesser share, 
still had more than they would have had under equality, then what is the harm? If under 
some asymmetrical distribution, I have, having the lesser amount, have more than I 
would under equality, surely then I would prefer the unequal arrangement, since, even 
if I have the lesser share of that, I have (ex hypothesi) the most that I can have. Thus, 
unequal distributions that are to the comparative advantage of the one with less are just, 
since those unequal distributions would be chosen, endorsed, from a position of initial 
fairness. And this, of course, just is the difference principle: differences in wealth (I 
will just use wealth to stand for any primary good in this formulation) are acceptable 
only if they are to the advantage of those with the least amount under that distribution, 
and that means, only if those people are better off than they would be under any other 
distribution that approached, or reached, equality. 
 
Before getting to Cohen’s well known critique of the difference principle, two points of 
deep agreement between Cohen and Rawls need to be mentioned. There is first the 
exclusion, under the veil of ignorance, of any knowledge of talent or traits of character 
that would play out advantageously in a market setting. And this exclusion, or 
ignorance by the parties of this feature of themselves, simply expresses the idea, which 
Cohen wholly endorses, that these features of ourselves are “morally arbitrary,” and so 
have no business grounding any claims to differences in outcome. (96) As I will argue 
later, Cohen spends far too little time on the entitlement issue, on the possibly 
justifiable role talent or extra effort might play in differences in outcome, and this is 
largely because he tends to see the “morally arbitrary” line on talent to be so obvious 
and so decisive as to render the issue hardly worth revisiting. (And this in turn is a very 
big mistake.) Cohen is absolutely right to see this claim as central to how we are to 
understand the circumstances under which we will choose the principles that will 
govern the basic structure of society. He is quite wrong to see this claim as one we 
should affirm metaphysically as it were, as true in its own right, and so as appropriately 
controlling wherever it might be relevant. It is precisely because he does see this 
account of talent, and so its irrelevance, as always controlling, that he will see whatever 
differences we could ever imagine under the difference principle to be “brute,” the 
result of mere selfishness, bargaining, and so forth. And because this reading of the 
difference principle is the only one Cohen can imagine, he can always reasonably ask 
that these differences be set aside. (32-33, 41) 
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A second deep point of agreement is this: Cohen has no real quarrel with the 
fundamental structure of Rawls’ assessment strategy: an arrangement really is just if it 
really is the best it can be for the least advantaged. (29; 94-95) Rawls has the criterion 
absolutely right. The difference principle however is in fact very much not that 
arrangement, or more precisely: not the principle that will inevitably deliver it.  
  
And why is that? The answer is, because it allows for far too much self interest and self 
dealing, and so for far too much unjustifiable inequality. (72) In essence, Cohen’s anti-
difference principle argument runs like this. Under the veil of ignorance, we affirm the 
equal worth of all citizens. We affirm the morally arbitrary nature of talent and those 
qualities of personality that generate advantages in the marketplace (say a winning 
smile if you are a salesman, or a willingness just to stay late and check your work a 
third time if you are devoid of charisma). We affirm the non-controversial worth of 
primary goods. We are to be risk averse, thereby guaranteeing we will look out for the 
worst off. And voila, what follows just is the two principles of justice. There will be 
maximal liberty compatible with equal liberty for all, and if there are to be differences 
in wealth, then those must be part of a scheme that will benefit the worst off. OK, fine. 
Now we come out from under the veil of ignorance, and lo and behold, people have 
their particular life plans, conceptions of the good, traits of character, talents and so 
forth. And they will naturally seek to do as well as they can for themselves and their 
loved ones within the fundamental structures affirmed. Presumably, the talented or hard 
working will be taxed highly, leaving them with just enough to make it worth their 
while to perform these tasks to begin with, thereby leaving all (and so the worst off) 
better off than they would have been had the talented not performed these tasks at all. 
But as Cohen points out, surely the talented can now bargain far more aggressively – 
and within the constraints of so called justice (i.e., within the constraints of justice as 
Rawls has understood it). That is, all that has to happen for an asymmetrical 
distribution between the talented surgeon and the unskilled worker to comply with the 
difference principle is that it has to leave the worker better off than he would be under 
any available rival. But if the surgeon simply refuses to work at all unless he gets to 
keep almost all of his earnings, then, so long as the redistribution, however meagre, to 
the worker leaves him better off than he would have been had there been no excess 
wealth to redistribute at all, this vastly unequal distribution is nevertheless “just,” since 
it is, after all, in compliance with the difference principle. The surgeon can earn his 
$500,000, agree to redistribute one percent, or $5000 to the worker, and claim, rightly, 
that this extra $5000 leaves the worker better off than he would have been had there 
been nothing to redistribute at all… and voila! It turns out that that greedy America 
represents the difference principle as well as egalitarian Sweden. But is the greed of the 
wealthy that makes this so. (57-60, 122, 130, 153)  
 
What has gone wrong? Rawls has failed to realize that the difference principle gets 
enacted along an enormous spectrum of possible arrangements depending on the ethos 
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of the parties, depending on how mean spirited or egalitarian in temperament, citizens 
are. (123) And it seems crazy, or at the least inconsistent, to insist on the equality of all, 
to insist on the equally deserving nature of all, when under the veil of ignorance, when 
in an initial position of fairness, where we identify what is central and what is spurious 
for all time from the standpoint of political justice, and then, once the principles have 
been chosen, to be absolutely indifferent to equality, to allow for or not say anything 
about the selfishness and self dealing that is now fully tolerated, and that can 
completely eviscerate equality, leaving something approaching class warfare in its 
wake. If we believe in equality, as we clearly do, hence the structure of the argument, 
then, we cannot be indifferent to it when in real life the ethos of selfishness may well 
leave us with none of it (besides whatever equality can be vouchsafed by compliance 
with the first principle, of course). For Cohen, it is not as if we cannot affirm equality 
and also make sense of some asymmetries of compensation. We can, for example, make 
sense of giving a little bit more to those who do more dangerous work for example (56, 
73), but apart from marginal examples like these, when we turn to the mere fact that 
some have a talent others do not, the basic thought is, well, so what? Why should the 
surgeon not be just willing to do this work within the spirit, the ethos, of equality? 
Why, to put the point philosophically, should we not insist on carrying the very norms 
we endorsed in the initial position of fairness through into actual work life, where they 
count for something (for the first time one might say)? (57-60; 129) 
 
Of course, there is the argument that if we insist on equality, there will just be less for 
all. It just may be that those with talent or ability will just not do the work – that was 
always the point of the difference principle, to accommodate this feature of human 
nature, yes? And it is here that Cohen’s argument gets interesting – not for what it says 
so much but for what it leaves out. Cohen considers this move by the “talented rich” (or 
“high fliers,” or whatever other term of abuse lies handy) – but: he sets aside any 
version of any argument to this end that appeals to desert or entitlement. That argument 
Cohen thinks is not available when within Rawls because Rawls has affirmed the 
morally arbitrary nature of talent distributions. (95-97) And since Cohen thinks that 
Rawls is absolutely right to have done so, to have made this point about the nature of 
talent, he thinks that whatever the differences we might find when living in a society in 
compliance with the difference principle cannot be justified by any appeal to desert. 
Over and over again, he considers a vast range of examples and cases, but in no case 
can the surgeon say to the worker, look, I deserve this compensation, because it is what 
my work is worth. Since that claim can never be true, it is not one we will bother to 
bring in as a possible route of justification. The only justifications Cohen considers are, 
as I say, those of the brute bargain maker. Readers may be surprised, perhaps even 
offended, to see Cohen analogize the talented worker who seeks higher compensation 
to the kidnapper who points out to the distraught victim that he (the parent) is far better 
off with the child, and without the ransom money, than he would be otherwise. (38 – 
41, 48, 60) Whether the kidnapper has a right to make this demand is of course quite 
beside the point – given that this is the demand he makes, it is then surely rational to 
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give into it. Given the alternatives, the parent is better off once reunited with his child. 
Given the alternatives, the unskilled worker is better off with the meagre $5000 
redistribution than with nothing, and if the demand may not be judged, we must say the 
surgeon may justly keep almost he makes. Since the talented can make this demand, 
they will. And since all you need to ask is whether you are better off than you would be 
if you did not let me have my way… well, I am sure the reader gets the idea. 
 
And so, given that the appeal to desert or entitlement has been taken off the table 
(whether rightly or not we will get to momentarily), it is going to follow that the only 
justifications for asymmetries within the difference principle will be those grounded in 
pure, brute, desire, the brutal bargaining of the amoral kidnapper or the indifferent 
stronger party. And given that, it makes perfect sense for Cohen to say – as he always 
does – no way! You should not have this desire, or, more accurately: you should not be 
allowed to let this desire have this sort of authority. Given what we affirmed in the 
original position, how can this sort of gross perversion of our fair society be allowed? 
We should instead arrange things along more egalitarian lines in actual society too. We 
should be encouraged to nurture and act on egalitarian motives, and we should arrange 
things objectively so that persons find that the differences in compensation actually 
offered diminish mightily. The surgeon should not mind making only modestly more 
than the nurse, if any more at all, (since the desire for the contrary is without 
justification), and the hospital should try to approximate this state of affairs in the 
salaries offered. How we get to this point is a tricky matter, but so what? This can be 
set aside. Surely Cohen has done enough in pointing out how inadequate the difference 
principle on its own is as a blueprint for any sort of real justice in daily life. (74-81) It is 
enough that we see that the sort of self interested bargaining that the difference 
principle countenances has no justification, any more than the bargaining of the 
kidnapper has any justification. Though it may be hard for us to accommodate this 
insight, or to know how to go about living in ways that express it - as it is no doubt hard 
for us to accommodate the requirement to give modestly that follows from Singer’s 
arguments - still, this is what follows, and this is what we should do. This is the society 
that would really be to the best advantage of the least advantaged - one where the 
talented did exactly the same work they do for maximal compensation and yet asked for 
no more compensation than anyone else.  
 
Well, that this arrangement would be to the maximal advantage of the least advantaged 
cannot I think be coherently denied. Obviously, that unskilled worker gets the best 
possible arrangement ever if everyone provides whatever services they can provide, and 
the wealth is then divided more or less equally. Thus we approximate Marx’s “from 
each according to his abilities and to each according to his needs” – though not exactly, 
and in ways that actually improve upon it, for here the second part would be, “and to 
each according to what equality of distribution entails.” Of course, of course – it is not 
as if “needs” disappears completely from our sense of what the right distribution should 
be – in Cohen’s world, the handicapped child would surely get a wheelchair (I take this 
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to be obvious) – but to get into this sort of issue would be a distraction. The central 
point is clear. An argument in which we affirm the worth of all, and equal respect for 
all, on the level of theory and then cheerfully abandon these norms on the level of 
practice cannot be right. An ethos of egalitarianism, and the enactment of that ethos, is 
precisely what is necessary if we are to rescue justice and equality.  
 
I believe that Cohen has made a genuinely interesting mistake, or set of related 
mistakes. I think this for a several reasons. There are certain claims that I have 
attributed to Cohen that I think are not quite right, claims I would dispute quite apart of 
their implications. But the main reason I think Cohen has made an interesting mistake is 
because of where he winds up. Cohen winds up affirming a conception of social 
relations that truly makes no sense to me. And whenever a philosopher does that, 
whenever a philosopher winds up in a place that is no longer recognizable or plausible 
given the most non-controversial pre-philosophical claims we can make, then we just 
know he has made a mistake. And so it is here. The idea that there is no place, when 
assessing differences in compensation, for any appeal to desert or talent or entitlement 
just has to be wrong. And that appeal to desert often generates a justification about as 
good as a justification ever gets just has to be right. Surely John Rawls deserved the 
Harvard chair he held, with its excellent salary, its minimal course load, its expense 
account, far more than I would have. I suppose I could, in a footnote, take the time to 
explain patiently just why this is so, but for the time being, I am pretty confident that 
this is one claim even my sharpest critic will concede. You might say, well, OK, 
maybe, but he should have been willing to do this work, to write these books and 
articles, for whatever the figure would have been had the cumulative wealth of the 
nation been more or less divided equally. Rawls might be five times more talented than 
Ross (I would put the ratio far higher, but this will do) but that does not mean he 
deserves more than Ross. And if we really say this, or really believe it, then we have 
begun to imagine or construct a world that in fact makes no sense – or so I will argue. 
Of course Rawls is more talented than Ross, and of course he deserves something better 
than what Ross deserves. The idea that we would arrange things so that this undeniable 
platitude would not get some genuine representation in the world is about as coherent to 
me as the idea that we might try to arrange things so that people did not fall in love 
because of the way they found others attractive. Or seek the company of those they 
found more witty or intelligent. These judgments of merit or ability or talent are so 
natural to us, so deep for us, it might really be impossible to overstate this feature of our 
lives. It is hard to imagine trying to form a sentence, throw a ball, hum a tune, or repel 
an intruder without also being the kind of creature who notices, is struck by, those who 
can do these things better.  Chances are, the first time you noticed and were struck by 
someone doing something that you wanted to do, but better, it was your parents. When 
I say these judgments are “natural,” I really mean it. And if these judgments are 
inevitable simply to noticing the world, simply to being in it, the expression of these 
judgments must be too. And it is just not obvious what form the expression of these 
judgments might take. We might give praise, a prize, an offer or marriage – even a 
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salary. I cannot imagine a world in which these judgments were not made and once 
made, expressed in some tangible form or other any more than I can imagine a world in 
which sexual attraction did not play a role in courtship. (You can try, of course, but 
why would you bother? The results just can’t be that interesting.) The idea that we 
might not want to represent the judgments we naturally, and rightly, make into life – or 
more precisely, that we might be at home in a world where these judgments were either 
not made or not extended – this to me really is “pure philosophy,” almost silly, 
certainly not in any way plausible. When we have reached a point in our argument 
where we affirm a world like this, and further, even treat it as some sort of ideal, then it 
we know we have made a wrong turn and must start again. If someone really does such 
and such better: does philosophy better, plays the cello better, grown tomatoes better, 
makes conversation better, makes movies better, why not say this, acknowledge this? 
And if it is to be acknowledged, what then is wrong with this acknowledgment taking 
the form of praise, or vacation time, or more money – in short, in the form of a better 
job?  
 
But wait a moment – what about Rawls’ own alleged hostility to talent? Doesn’t Rawls 
himself see talent as “morally arbitrary” and so as rightly not grounding any claims to 
special treatment? It is pretty undeniable that he conceives of the parties in the original 
position as having no knowledge of their own talent or abilities when determining the 
fundamental principles of society – that is pretty clear. And Rawls is clearly not 
satisfied with mere “equality of opportunity,” allowing our natural talents and abilities 
the outcome they would have in the absence of discrimination or class structure. (96) 
Cohen turns to a nice summary by Thomas Nagel for an account of Rawls’ argument 
against allowing talent to make a difference. It is simply a matter of following the right, 
intuitively compelling political principles with which we begin, through, consistently, 
to their natural conclusion: 
 
… the principle of negative quality of opportunity which excludes deliberate 
discrimination, depends of the belief that the social system should not assign 
benefits or disadvantages solely on the basis of differences between people for 
which they are not responsible and which they have done nothing to deserve… 
 
Yet a system which guarantees only negative equality of opportunity permits class 
inequalities [which are equally undeserved] to develop…It must therefore be 
supplemented of the resources that will permit each potential competitor to develop his 
natural abilities and therefore to be in a position to take advantage of his opportunities. 
That is what Rawls means by fair equality of opportunity.  
 
The same reasoning leads him further. Even under a regime of fair equality of 
opportunity, undeserved inequalities would continue to arise… people are not equal in 
natural ability, and their natural or genetic differences will continue to affect the 
benefits they gain from interaction with the social and economic order. Yet this too is 
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morally arbitrary, for people are no more responsible for their genetic endowment than 
for their race or the economic status of their parents. Consequently a just society will 
counter these underserved differences in benefit to the extent that it can do so without 
hurting the very people whose arbitrary penalization it is most concerned to rectify, 
namely, those who come in last in the socioeconomic race. Hence, the difference 
principle. (161)  
 
And if Cohen is just carrying forward the principles that Rawls himself sees right to 
endorse, how wrong can he be?  
 
Well, this is an interesting issue. I think Rawls’ relation to the moral arbitrariness of 
talent argument (what I will sometimes call the “morally arbitrary” argument) is subtler 
than first appears. To begin with, I believe, when reconstructing Rawls, this argument, 
this commitment, should be thought of as confined to the understandings governing the 
original position. Like other claims of this type, it is not meant to be thought of as 
getting at the whole truth of the issue in question. Consider: we also treat all 
conceptions of the good as equally justified in the original position, but it hardly 
follows we must say they in fact are evaluatively equivalent. It is the right thing to say 
when constructing the principles governing the basic structure of society. It is not the 
right thing to say tout court. Similarly, we see the parties under the veil of ignorance as 
self interested, and risk averse. This does not mean (as earlier critics in fact supposed) 
that Rawls thinks of persons this way, as always this way, or as essentially this way. 
Hardly. Second, I think what it means to think of talent as “morally arbitrary” may be 
far subtler than is usually realized. To put the view I will argue for in a nutshell, the 
moral occupies a small subset of the evaluative. It may well be, to speak in Kantian 
terms, that talent cannot ground any claim to moral worth. But the issue of moral worth 
refers to but one assessment framework among many. Wit, courage, intelligence, (to 
continue in the Kantian voice) may well not be “good in themselves,” but Kant would 
be the first to concede (since he does so in the very first paragraph of the Groundwork) 
that all can still be praised, assessed, and acknowledged along meritocratic lines. 
 
These two points are not unrelated. It is in part because I believe that the moral 
arbitrariness of talent does not get at the whole truth about the assessments talent may 
legitimately ground that I also believe, when thinking about Rawls’ relationship to the 
“morally arbitrary” argument, we should think of Rawls’ commitment to it as confined 
to the understandings governing the original position alone. That is, I am attributing to 
Rawls the position I think independently best. I will say a bit more about this below, 
but let us return to Cohen.  
 
I think it is central to understanding Rescuing Justice and Equality, central to 
understanding how it is that Cohen winds up where he does, to see that Cohen affirms 
the “morally arbitrary” argument as just true, and further, as always controlling 
wherever it is relevant. This is why he sees the disparities in compensation always and 
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only in terms of brute power, the truculent insistence on simply getting one’s way. 
While this sort of story does not generate much of a justification, and the justification 
story it generates is easily overpowered by the arguments Cohen brings to bear against 
it, the sort of justification it generates is not, at least, ruled out from the start by way 
Cohen understands the “morally arbitrary” argument. And that’s why the brute choice 
justification is the one Cohen returns to, elaborates upon, and defeats over and over 
again. It is, more or less, because of the “morally arbitrary” argument, the only one in 
play. The “morally arbitrary” argument is like a very big, very determined doorman at a 
night club, and the desert or entitlement argument for differences in compensation is 
very much not on that guest list. It never gets in the door. Why should it? If differences 
in talent really are morally arbitrary, then why should they ever ground any difference 
in outcome?  
 
Well, at this point, I am afraid it just can’t be avoided; we must do what Cohen does 
not, i.e., think about the morally arbitrary argument in some detail, what it does and 
does not show. Let me begin by saying just what I understand the morally arbitrary 
argument to be. I take the argument to be given in the following two claims:  
 
1) talent is distributed, or attaches to persons, for reasons that are themselves 
random, causally contingent, and so morally arbitrary, (95-96) and,  
2) therefore, as a result of (1), no one can have any morally justified claim on 
any good in virtue of talent.  
 
OK, first a point about completeness. Let us assume you think this argument is true. 
That does not mean you think, or have to think, this argument gives us the whole truth 
about the issue in question. I mean, you might well think that every intentional state is a 
brain state, but you might also think that is not all there is to say about the matter, that 
there are true, non-reducible descriptions of mental states that are not brain state 
descriptions too. It might be hard to say how these are both true, and it might be hard to 
say how intentional non-physical descriptions and pure brain state descriptions fit, sure, 
but you don’t get anywhere by denying half of the puzzle, by just repeating the brain 
state half. You just stop the puzzle from arising, since each half of this puzzle, each 
statement in its own right, is as compelling as the other. I think something comparable 
might be true here too. You might say, yes it seems the morally arbitrary argument is 
right, and at the same time, it also seems just as right, just as undeniable, that Rawls 
deserved the chair he held at Harvard, deserved this job, far more than Ross. You might 
be puzzled as to how both can be true (I am not, but it is certainly possible that 
someone could be) but you hardly have to deny what the “morally arbitrary” argument 
affirms. You just have to be committed to figuring out how to fit these two together, 
how to give an account of the world in which the truth each expresses is somehow 
accommodated. But as the brain state / intentional description case is supposed to show, 
this – being committed to some accommodation but being unable to say just what this 
account will be – is not so unrespectable a position in philosophy as you might think. I 
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put this point forward because, though I do have a possible solution as to how it is that 
the “morally arbitrary” argument can be true, and it also be true that Rawls deserves his 
chair, the reader does not have to accept my solution, or any solution, to be able to 
affirm, quite consistently, the thought that there must be some solution. There must be 
some account in which we make sense of both being true, because if any of these two 
claims is the one we cannot give up, not easily, not naturally, it is the claim about 
Rawls deserving his chair, and deserving it more than I do.  
 
Now let me sketch the accommodation solution I favor. Because, as was suggested 
above, this solution is broadly Kantian in character, it is not going to be too hard for me 
to attribute this view to Rawls too. Once I have done that, I will say a bit as to how this 
conceptual framework would play out in actual social practice, what it would mean to 
be a Rawlsian, committed to excluding talent when within the original position, and 
allowing it a kind of robust representation once the veil is lifted. In short, I will say 
something about what it would be like to have a world governed by the difference 
principle where the difference principle in turn is understood in ways not vulnerable to 
Cohen like objections.  
 
Rawls, of course, is not only constructing a distinctively liberal political theory; this is 
liberalism with a distinctively Kantian flavor. Unlike utilitarianism which thinks of 
persons as equal claimants to an aggregative good, here we conceive of persons as 
autonomous deliberative agents, deserving respect. And it will be crucial, on this view, 
that a just society expresses or mirrors this conception of persons in a satisfactory way. 
When thinking of persons in this way, as autonomous deliberative agents, obviously, 
the degree to which they otherwise differ will not matter. That people are in fact (in 
addition to being autonomous) more or less intelligent, imaginative, lively, 
entrepreneurial, witty or kind is not relevant – if all you are considering is the fact that 
persons are autonomous, how could it be? So, if we wanted to say how society might 
respect persons as autonomous creatures, what understandings such a society would be 
bound by, it makes perfect sense to think of the following procedure as a way of 
figuring out what these understandings should be. Let us imagine hypothetical parties 
that are to choose the fundamental principles they will live by, and we imagine these 
hypothetical parties as governed by self interest but ignorant of all the ways in which 
they otherwise differ. Thus, all that will get carried forward into the assessment of 
possible rivals is protection of persons as autonomous creatures. To say that talent is 
“morally arbitrary” is just to say that this difference across persons is irrelevant to what 
it is to respect persons. And so it is. The unskilled labourer deserves just as much 
respect, qua person, as Harold Pinter. And Pinter would be the first to say so. 
Differences in talent, like any other contingent fact about us (our beauty) are 
meaningless, from this point of view. Ignorance of one’s own talent under the veil of 
ignorance is just a way of expressing this evaluative fact, just as ignorance of one’s race 
or religion expresses the counterpart evaluative fact about race or religion. These 
differences, and what we think of them, are irrelevant to this project; “ignorance,” in 
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this framework, simply makes sure (or expresses the conviction that) they do not count, 
and that what should count (alone) does. Respecting persons will be to treat them in 
certain ways (we do not, having not yet chosen the principles, know yet what these 
ways are) regardless of their talent, or regardless of their race, or regardless of their 
gender. This much we can say before we even know what the content of respect for 
persons will be. Whatever it is, whatever it turns out to be, talent variation must be, 
irrelevant. 
 
Now, it was Rawls’ great genius (inter alia) to see that this project of respecting 
persons in framing social principles could not be completely unrelated to access to 
resources. Kant himself was famously hostile to allowing interest in ends into his 
account of moral goodness, and the subsequent impoverishment (and obscurity) of the 
categorical imperative test testifies to the limits of this strategy. Rawls is happy to 
borrow a page from utilitarian theory and worry about welfare when worrying about 
respecting persons. It simply is not plausible to say one is committed to respecting 
persons as autonomous agents and then not worry at all about the resources persons 
have at their disposal to pursue reasonable life plans. This is why the parties do not stop 
when they have chosen the first principle, giving them all equal freedoms. We would 
not want someone’s ability to make and live out their life choices to be non-existent 
simply because of a lack of competitiveness in the marketplace. Some account of talent-
indifferent wealth distribution must be determined as well. Given the way Rawls has set 
up the original position, given self interest combined with risk aversion, of course, the 
difference principle alone can follow. The difference principle describes a distribution 
that is maximally favourable to the least advantaged, or more accurately, those least 
successful within the marketplace. Under the veil of ignorance, concerned only with the 
least advantaged, we are necessarily indifferent to how it comes about that a 
distribution might satisfy the difference principle. And this is where Cohen comes in – 
he imagines a story in which the difference principle is satisfied through coercion and 
greed. When that story is told, it is always right to say, as Cohen always says, but we 
could do so much better without the greed! Why have that? Under the veil, blind to 
different ways in which this pattern could be satisfied in real life, we are vulnerable to 
Cohen like considerations. But this is not unlike Nozick’s famous (and more facile) jibe 
about the emptiness of equality, conceived merely as a pattern. Someone who believes 
in an equal distribution hardly contemplates the case where the thief steals half of my 
$100, leaving us both with $50. It would hardly be an interesting counterexample to 
egalitarianism to point to that narrative and sneer, “so is that what you had in mind? 
You shouldn’t complain; it is “equality,” isn’t it?” From the fact that the parties under 
the veil of ignorance are conceived of in ways that makes them unable to distinguish 
different ways in which the difference principle could be satisfied (being interested 
only the best for the least, as such) hardly means that we cannot say anything on this 
issue or distinguish between different ways in which the difference principle could be 
realized.  
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Cohen presents differences in compensation as the result, and so the expression, of 
adversarial bargaining. Of course this is one way in which substantive differences 
might arise, but it is hardly the only one. Differences in compensation might instead be 
arranged to reflect well founded beliefs about entitlement or desert. So, for example, I 
might think (I do think) that, given the nature of the work, and the nature of what you 
need in the way of training to be able to do it, a policeman, or a nurse, or a teacher, 
deserves to make at least $80,000 in the New York area. And I might well think (I do 
think) that someone who performs the job of a doorman or security guard does not 
deserve a salary anywhere near that high. Imagine extending these episodic 
assessments, and constructing a more or less comprehensive scheme, in which we 
correlated all jobs or occupations to a compensation level that reflected our considered 
views about desert. This is not so crazy an idea as might first appear. A scheme of 
criminal law reflects a comprehensive scheme of well thought out views about what 
every punishable act deserves. So, analogously, imagine a more or less comprehensive 
account of kinds of work and well considered views about what each kind deserved. 
(These views do not have to be perfect or “beyond challenge,” they just have to be 
reasonably well justified.) Imagine a society structured along these lines; well, that 
society would surely comply with the difference principle. After all, such compensation 
levels, being well considered or justified, would certainly attract the efforts of the 
talented, and as a result these differences in compensation would be part of a practice 
that was to the advantage of the least advantaged. (Notice: it is not the “differences in 
compensation” as such that are to the advantage of the least advantaged; it is the policy 
or practice they are a part of that is. Obviously, it is not “grades as such” that advance 
educational goals; it is the practice of justified evaluation that grades express that does, 
if anything does.) Let us call this sort of compliance with the difference principle 
“entitlement-based compliance with the difference principle.”  
 
Now of course, the idea of jobs or occupations being captured within some 
comprehensive entitlement scheme can only go so far. There are some ways of being in 
the economy where compensation can fluctuate wildly without raising any serious 
question of desert either way. If a teacher taught responsibly for a term and was not 
paid a decent salary I would think this most unjust. He did not get what he deserves. 
But actors, rock musicians and real estate salesman can work very hard and make very 
little, or work relatively little and make a great deal – and here, the idea of desert or 
entitlement gets very little foothold either way. Before some ways of making a living, it 
seems the issue of desert does not really arise; baring fraud, the outcome that “should” 
occur is simply what does occur through the expression of individual market choices (it 
is precisely this intuition that Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain example exploits so well). 
The rock musician who makes nothing after years of trying has nothing to be indignant 
about (which is not the same as saying he has nothing to complain about), and the 
bands (like Abba) that make millions though talentless ought not to raise any reaction 
of indignation from others (very much unlike the grossly overpaid CEO case). My 
thought is: we imagine a world in which all that should be tied to a well thought out 
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conception of compensation is, and all the rest is rightly left to market outcomes. Let us 
further imagine that incomes generated through the second category are taxed, when 
high, at a high rate. This would be a world in perfect entitlement compliance with the 
difference principle.  
 
It is clear, I hope, that this realization of the difference principle is not really vulnerable 
to Cohen-like objections. I mean, of course, we could ask the trained nurse with ten 
years experience to take a $20,000 pay cut, (assuming she makes $20,000 more than 
she needs, or the average, whichever) since doing so certainly would be to the 
advantage of the least of advantaged, and she might be altruistic enough to do it. But 
why should we? There is, ex hypothesi absolutely nothing unjust about her income now. 
And on my reading of Rawls, from the fact when under the veil of ignorance, we are to 
assess rival arrangements from the standpoint of the least advantaged most 
emphatically does not mean that this consideration trumps everything else once we are 
in real life. One might as well say because when under the veil of ignorance we must 
treat all conceptions of the good as equal, parents cannot, in real life, claim with a 
straight face in front of their children that a life of friendship and love is better than one 
of selfishness. Cohen completely misses the way the standpoint of “best for the least 
advantaged” is a device; using it, under the veil of ignorance, we make sure that respect 
for persons has an appropriate representation in the matter of resources. It is not a 
criterion-from-God we are to be slavishly devoted to maximizing everywhere. But that 
is exactly what Cohen thinks.  
 
And if this is right, we can say something further. An entitlement based realization of 
the difference principle is not simply the best (by which I mean, “most justified”) 
version of the difference principle we can imagine; it is I think the version of the 
difference principle we can think of as contemplated by the parties under the veil of 
ignorance. After all, we are to imagine the parties having access to all relevant non-
controversial claims.  Consider the following claim, which I will call “super-modest 
Lockeanism”:  
 
S-ML: significant differences in talent and effort, expressed in labor over time, 
should not make no difference whatsoever in compensation.  
 
We need not, in affirming super-modest Lockeanism, affirm anything like a Lockean 
conception of property or property rights. No one is saying that the farmer who stays up 
late, attends to his fields with assiduous devotion, and grows one and a half as many 
tomatoes as his neighbour, has an absolute Nozick like property-claim on every extra 
dollar he winds up with. But it would be very strange, very strange indeed, if that 
farmer and his less talented farmer-neighbor would up with exactly the same amount 
too. That is all, really, that super-modest Lockeanism says. Significant differences in 
talent or effort expressed over time must make some difference in outcome. And 
because this idea, is, for me, so central to the world we know that to deny it would be to 
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risk sense, I have no difficulty imagining the parties having access to it, or affirming it, 
when deciding upon the basic structure of society. Of course, you cannot know your 
talent. And that, combined with risk aversion, generates the difference principle. But 
just because you cannot know your talent hardly means you can have no beliefs about 
talent. That would follow only if there were no general beliefs about talent to be had. 
And why would anyone ever say that? Suppose a group of us were to found a 
university, and at the point of this initial founding, we don’t know anything about how 
talented we may prove to be in higher mathematics. Fine. But from this it hardly 
follows that we would not want grades in our mathematics courses, not want ways of 
tracking ability that in turn had differential outcomes for the bearers of that ability. We 
can affirm general non-controversial claims about talent in the absence of knowing 
where we fall in the spectrum of talent. Super-modest Lockeanism is exactly such a 
claim. And so I imagine the parties under the veil of ignorance affirming the difference 
principle expecting that when realized, it will be realized in its “entitlement 
compliance” form.  
 
And of course, on this reconstruction of Rawls, and on this way of understanding the 
difference principle, Cohen’s criticisms of Rawls, his gleeful pokes about “high fliers” 
(153) and the “bastards” (199) who make more than others, the analogy with the 
kidnapper who immorally demands a ransom (40), is all completely, annoyingly, off the 
point. These criticisms turn out to be not very interesting, not very deep, after all, for 
they set aside from the start the one thing that might make compensation differentials 
justified, and then argue, unsurprisingly, that such differentials are not justified!  
 
And that is really pretty much the essence of it.  
 
